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1   The author expresses his gratitude to Bruno Wilhelm Speck for having read drafts of this note. The usual 
disclaimers apply. 
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Summary 
Three factors dominate the outcome of a tender in public procurement: 1) The amount 
of the penalties those found guilty of corruption are subjected to; 2) The efficiency of 
control and enforcement mechanisms; 3) The intrinsic vulnerability of the system. A fourth 
factor, the (prior) probability of a participant cleanly winning a contract, plays no role in 
the decision to bribe or not to bribe. In environments where regulations are lax and controls 
do not function, cleanly participating in tenders is irrational. Restricting the study to unit 
prices in markets for standard goods and services, an increase in one single firm’s 
propensity to bribe induces the same behaviour upon the others (“bad apple effect”), and 
therefore the likelihood of firms to bribe tends to uniformity. Competition unsettles the 
equilibrium, so that, ceteris paribus, the overall likelihood of bribing tends to a maximum 
determined by the control mechanisms. The factors affecting the expectation of public 
officials are the same, with the added feature that usually public officials have no rewards 
for not taking bribes. For both participants and agents, simple methods to empirically 
determine parameters and to evaluate whether or not bribery probably prevails in a given 
market are suggested. The vulnerability stemming from the formal regulations directly 
influence the likelihood of bribing, while the efficiency of controls can be fed-back into 
that likelihood. The system’s tendency to deteriorate points to policy strategies aimed at 
continuously perfecting the regulations and the control mechanisms. There are two basic 
mechanisms whereby tenders are biased: by unlawful acts and by lawful manipulation of 
conditions. While evidence as to the occurrence of the former is relatively easy to obtain, 
hard evidence of bribery associated to the latter can only arise from discovering secret 
exchanges of money, which in turn requires expensive investigation techniques. On that 
basis it is argued that continuously acting on the regulations to diminish the opportunities 
for manipulation of conditions has a more profound effect on the overall efficiency of the 
system, including but beyond control of corruption, than striving to enhance detection. 
Keywords: Control, corruption, public procurement, regulation. 
JEL classification numbers: D44, D84, H57, K23. 
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1   Decision factors in tenders 
A tender in public procurement is an event whereby a State organism (the “principal”) 
calls for offers from private firms (“participants”) to furnish goods or services. Auctions (as 
in privatizations) also fall in the category of procuring. A surrogate for the principal (the 
“agent”) conducts the process and awards the ensuing contract. A set of rules defines the 
conditions under which interested parties are allowed to participate and how the agent 
reaches the decision about the winner. These rules are enforceable within a certain 
administrative boundary – usually a whole country, but sometimes regional and/or 
municipal subdivisions, as well as publicly owned companies, have some latitude in 
defining specific rules. In some countries, there are no national regulations and each 
organism conducts procurement following its own rules. International financing institutions 
establish rules for procurement conducted with their money. International communities, as 
the European Union, likewise bind member countries to uniform regulations for 
procurement involving amounts above certain thresholds. 
Responsibility for enforcing the regulations fall on the agents, and ideally interested 
parties can interpose objections according to some administrative procedure that is 
specified in the regulations. In some environments, members of the public can do likewise. 
Recourse to the Judiciary to contest administrative decisions is in principle possible, but of 
course there are countries where exercising the right to contest is difficult or impossible in 
practice. 
Being the primary interface between the public and private sectors, public procurement 
is particularly vulnerable to distortions aimed at favouring particular suppliers. Public 
officials use the rules to restrict the participation of interested firms and direct the outcome 
to someone. One can safely say that in virtually all cases such intervention happens in 
return for a bribe. 
Bribery in public procurement can begin, and it often does, before the procurement 
itself takes place: A supplier pays a bribe to a high-placed official, often elected, to include 
a (not necessarily needed) project in the appropriate budget. From there on, the dice are 
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loaded and the briber gets the contract. After a tender is concluded and the corresponding 
contract is signed, it comes the execution phase. Again, this is potentially affected by 
distortions whereby in return for a bribe those responsible for overseeing the execution turn 
a blind eye to partial or non-performance. A common scheme to bias purchases is to over-
specify the more expensive components of a project, which are undercosted by the pre-
arranged winner. The latter gets the contract, because his price was less than the 
competitors’. During execution, the contractor furnishes cheaper but still safe and 
performing components (they were intentionally over-specified, after all), oversight ignores 
the deviation from specifications, the firm pockets the difference and pays a kickback to the 
official. 
By-products of bribery in procurement are overpricing, substandard goods and 
services, unfinished projects, unnecessary works and many other waste-generating effects. 
This is immediately harmful to public interest. Competition among firms is replaced by a 
stratified system of cartelised groups arranged by size and specialties.2 Partitioning of 
markets and price-fixing are stimulated. Firms become prisoners of a pecking order and 
forced to play a game in which big players hold the trumps. Sectors subjected to such 
market distortions cannot evolve healthfully. Innovation and personnel training are stifled, 
because cost-saving efforts cannot compete with unfair advantages given to others. 
Concentration limits the creation of jobs. Therefore, corruption in procurement harms 
competition.3 
What about the converse? It is usually held4 that one remedy against corruption is to 
enhance competition, but it must be registered that recent research points to possible 
qualifications to this. Celentani and Ganuza (2002) contend that the relationship between 
competition and corruption is ambiguous. They model a situation where a government 
                                                 
2   Besides these general remarks, this note will not address cartel-related collusion. 
3   See e.g. Mauro (1995 and 1998), Tanzi and Davoodi (1998), Søreide (2002). 
4   As Rose-Ackerman (1996, 1999) and others. 
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agency procures a non-homogeneous good that can be produced according to different 
levels of quality, the decision mechanism being dependent both on price and quality. They 
show that an increase in competition can lead both to lower and to higher corruption, in the 
latter case because the purchasing agent is able to manipulate the assessment of “quality” to 
bias the tender. More broadly, a positive relationship between competition and economic 
efficiency is partially challenged by Hong and Shum (2002). Studying the dynamics 
leading to equilibrium in certain types of tenders, they find that the average procurement 
cost for the principal strictly increases with the number of participants, and corroborate the 
finding with data from the New Jersey (US) Department of Transportation. However, the 
effect is only observed in some types of contracts, not all. Studying certain models of 
auctions, Compte and Jehiel (2002) find that although more competition lead to better 
welfare in symmetric auctions (all bidders share the same information), the opposite 
happens in asymmetric auctions: The introduction of one additional participant holding 
information the others do not share lowers the welfare. 
In this note we will look at the process after the decision to launch a project was taken. 
We will refer to the “tender” as the whole mechanism beginning with the announcement 
that the principal will take offers from firms (bids) to conduct the project and ending with 
the signing of the contract between the winner firm and the principal. Execution will not be 
addressed. 
Tenders can be modelled as a two- or more-participant game affected by a number of 
decision factors. Players can participate not using expedients aimed at directing the 
outcome for themselves (that is, cleanly), or they can bribe to win. In a clean tender, the 
decision is automatically reached on the the basis of the lower offered price, or involves a 
public agent’s decision (based on considerations of “quality” arising from participants’ 
offers), or some combination of these. As prices are objectively comparable but “quality” is 
not, the third type of decision process conflates into the second. These biddings are 
especially prone to rigging, due to the discretionary power exercised by the agent. See 
Burguet and Che (2002) for a modelling exhibiting the diseconomies ensuing from this type 
of procurement: Participants are stimulated to pay bribes in order to win, the cost of 
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procurement rises and the efficient participants more likely lose. Although the vulnerability 
of “quality” assessments is amply recognised, this method of evaluating bids is admissible 
in many legal environments. In particular, the guidelines of International Financing 
Institutions as the World Bank do not prohibit its use. Those guidelines supersede national 
legislations when projects are financed by IFIs, making the corresponding outcomes more 
prone to corruption in countries where judgements on “quality” are not admitted. 
Here we will consider tenders in which the decision is a mix of price and other 
variables, including a “quality” evaluation. The joint distribution of these variables 
translates for each participant into a certain probability of winning. The factors that 
determine the outcome of a tender are, in principle: 
The probability of a bidder winning a clean tender. 
The likelihood of participants deciding to bribe. 
The penalties applicable to firms found guilty of bribery. We will only consider 
measurable penalties, thus leaving out “moral” ones.5 
The probability of bribers being caught, arising from the efficiency of the control 
mechanisms in place. 
The mathematical treatment will remain at the elementary level. 
                                                 
5   As e.g. in Klitgaard (1991), Chapter 3, in reference to the factors influencing agents’ decisions. It must be 
pointed out that the treatment in this source, as in others that consider moral penalties, is only 
metaphorical. Besides the problems of quantifying morals, observe that including a moral penalty raises 
the matter as to corresponding advantages possibly to be included among the rewards of cleanly winning a 
contract. Also, completeness would require examining moral awards stemming from bribery. 
 Claudio Weber Abramo Prevention and detection in bribery-affected public procurement  7 
2  A decision model 
Using the elements just listed, the decision tree governing an two-participant (1 and 2) 
bidder’s game is the following. The game starts by selecting at random one participant to be 
the first to play. The branches inside the boxes do not belong to the decision tree proper, 
representing the alternatives that are not subjected to the players’ will, leading to the 
outcomes. We will refer to this model as “Model I”. 
1 - u
1/2 















C11-E-B1  1 wins 




Player doesn‘t bribe 
Player bribes 
Player 1 has probability ½ of being the first to play. If 1 bribes, then 2 cannot bribe. 
Player 2 can only bribe if 1 plays cleanly. If 2 is the first to play, the tree is the same, 
swapping 1 and 2. The various components have the following meanings: 
p1  The probability of Player 1 winning the contract in open bidding (so that the 
probability of 2 winning is p2 = 1 – p1); 
u  The systemic likelihood of bribing (the percentage of all contracts in the 
market in question that are biased); 
qj   The likelihood of player j bribing, depending on the probability of bribery 
occurring in that market (u), on the number of participants and on factors 
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peculiar to each j; if q1, q2  1, these likelihoods obey to 1 – u = (1 – q1)(1 – 
q2); 
Cj0    The value of the contract awarded to Bidder j if he is the winner in the 
absence of bribes; 
Cj1   The value of the contract won with a bribe Bj (and associated diseconomies) 
by Bidder j; we will consider an overprice in excess of the bribe, so that Cj1 – 
Bj > Cj0; 
E    The regular expenses incurred in participating (excluding bribes; for 
simplicity, defined as the same for both participants and normalized to 0 in the 
sequel); 
Bj   The amount paid by j as a bribe; 
R  The penalty paid if a briber is caught red-handed; for simplicity, the same for 
both participants; 
k  The probability of a briber being caught given that the tender was rigged.  
Now, if Bidder 1 decides to bribe, then he wins the contract, pays the bribe back and 
discounts the expenses. Bidder 2 is just a bystander. Because 1 bribed, he incurs in the risk 
of paying the penalty R with probability k. If Bidder 1 decides not to bribe, then it is Bidder 
2’s turn to play. He can decide either to bribe or not to bribe. If he does bribe, he gets the 
contract under the same conditions just stated. If 2 decides not to bribe, then the tender is 
openly contested and the contract goes to 1 with probability p1 or to 2 with probability 1 –
 p1. Whatever the case, players pay the amount corresponding to the expenses to participate. 
Choosing the best strategy for playing the game depends on the vulnerability of the 
tender (the probability u), on the risk of being caught in bribery (the penalty R and the 
probability  k) and on the probability of cleanly winning the contract. Suppose that the 
conditions are lax. Suppose also that there are penalties (of whatever size), but that the 
likelihood of a briber being caught is small. Bidder 1 evaluates that if he bribes, the contract 
would be his with small risk of incurring in penalties. He also reasons that if he refrains 
from bribing, then the opponent will evaluate the situation similarly, so his decision would 
be to bribe. Therefore, in order not to be duped, 1’s decision again would be in favour of 
 Claudio Weber Abramo Prevention and detection in bribery-affected public procurement  9 
bribing. If 2 knows that 1 did not bribe, then he holds all the trumps. Observe that for either 
participant, the probability of cleanly winning the contract does not play a role in the 
reasoning. Such is the situation in corrupted environments. 
If the opportunities to bribe (u) are few and the likelihood of being penalised for 
bribery (k) is high, then it would be better to take one’s chances in the open bidding 
process. And for this one must enhance one’s own probability of offering the lower price 
and/or other conditions in order to win (by cutting costs, developing better production 
processes etc.). If everybody does that continuously over time, prices fall down (and the 
law of diminishing returns takes hold). Of course, if the opportunities to attempt bribery are 
few, then on average bidders will decide to bribe less often. If, furthermore, bribes are often 
detected when practiced, then the risk grows and the rational justification to bribe loses 
weight. 
The situation can be seen in the probabilities. From the decision tree, and taking into 
account that 1 can either be the first or the second to play, it follows that the probabilities 
for the outcomes are (q1, q2  (0,1)): 
P(1 wins cleanly) = p1(1 – u) 
P(1 wins with a bribe and is not caught) = ½q1(1 – k)+ ½q1(1 – q2)(1 – k) = 
= (q1 – ½q1 q2)(1 – k) 
P(1 bribes and is punished) = (q1 – ½q1 q2)k 
Thus, for the random variable X1 = “outcome for Bidder 1”, and remembering that the 
expenses E were normalized to 0,  the expectation E(X1) is 
E(X1) = (q1 – ½q1 q2)[(1 – k)(C11 – B1) – kR]  + p1 (1 – u)C10. (2.1) 
Generalising to n players, the game begins with a random selection of an ordered 
sequence of play. Participants have probabilities {pj | j = 1…n; pj = 1} of winning in open 
tender and   = {qj | j = 1…n;  qj   (0,1)} of bribing if the opportunity arises. Let 
 = {(1 – qj)|qj  } and   j =  – {(1– qj)}. For each pair (i,j), let   = {:Ii  
j
i  j}. 
The probabilities are 
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P(j wins cleanly) = pj (1 – u) 









































Other telling probability is: 




i q ) (1
Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3) furnish didactic information on the tendency of bribery spreading and 
becoming pervasive. Take, for example, a market with five participants, all with a similar 
propensity to bribe of, say, 10%. Then, the likelihood of tenders conducted in that market 
being corrupted is about 41%. Suppose that the probabilities of cleanly winning are 
normally distributed around 1/n. Then, from (2.3) it follows that a non-bribing new entrant 
in that market will lose with a probability of about 90%, while the probability of losing in 
clean tender would be 83%. Thus, for the new entrant, cleanly participating in tenders with 
the other five is not rationally justifiable. The entrant’s rational decision will be either to 
refrain from participating or to enter according to the rules of the environment, namely, 
bribing. In some markets, renouncing to participate is not a real option, because it would 
entail desisting altogether from the market and choosing some other business. 
The expectation for Bidder j is 

















 [(1 – k)(Cj1 – Bj) – kR]  + pj (1 – u)Cj0. (2.4) 
We are interested in examining the conditions for equilibrium in this set-up, that is, what 
must hold in order for E(Xi) = E(Xj) for all pairs (i,j). As it stands, (2.4) is too general to 
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allow for an analytic solution, so we will impose a few restrictions. Firstly, we will use unit 
prices instead of full contract values. With this, we can reasonably impose that pjCj0 are 
normally distributed around (
n
1
C0and likewise Cj1 – Bj are normally distributed ( 1 C ,), 
with some standard deviations  and . These constraints are intuitively justified in markets 
dealing with standard goods and services (such as e.g. routine public works). Full contracts 
including m components are then described by m-dimensional vectors. In the sequel, we 
will restrict the reasoning to unit prices and will not explicitly generalise to full contracts. 


















 [(1 – k)( 1 C   ) – kR] + 
n
1
C0   
with some probability depending on ,. Irrespective of  and , equilibrium is achieved 
when qj = q for all j, that is, when all players have the same propensity to bribe. As E(Xj) is 
strictly increasing with qj, the equilibrium is unstable. If one player starts bribing more 
often than the others, then, in order not to end up with lower expectations, the others follow 
suit and adopt the same strategy. This might be called the “bad apple effect”. Moreover, as 
competition in the market tends to unsettle equilibria, ceteris paribus if somebody starts 
bribing more often, the others will follow his lead. Over time, the propensity to bribe tends 
to a maximum determined by the efficiency of the control mechanisms. There is no “good 
apple effect”: Any player who bribes less often loses more often. 
Getting back to eq. (2.4) with the equilibrium condition in place, the summation of 
products reduces to 









i q q ) (









i q q ) (
using the mean values  1 C  and 
n
1
C0 and simplifying the notation we get: 
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E = E(Xj) 	  u
n
1
[(1 – k) 1 C  – kR]  + 
n
1
(1 – u)C0. (2.5) 
With this, the game becomes equivalent to a game in which, first, it is determined with 
probability u if it will be affected by bribery. If it is, the participant who bribes is selected at 
random with probability 1/n. If the tender is not corrupted, then the tender is cleanly 
contested. Thus, the corresponding decision tree can be depicted as follows (hereafter 
referred to as Model II): 
(n-1)/n
1/n











1 - u 
u
Tender is corrupted 
Tender isn’t corrupted 
3 Empirical  implications 




[u 1 C  + (1 – u)C0] for k = 0 




[R – (1 – u)C0] for k = 1 
(all instances of bribery are detected). 
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[(1 – k) 1 C  – kR  – C0]. (3.1) 







0 1  = k0. (3.2) 
E increases with u for k < k0 and decreases for k > k0. Graph 1 (corresponding to the 
projection of the surface defined by eq. (2.5) over the plane E x u) illustrates what happens: 
k0 corresponds to the level of control that makes the expectation equal to the expectation 
stemming from a clean tender. Anything above it corresponds to expectations coming from 
bribery. From eq. (3.2) it follows that if  1 C  (the unit component of the liquid value of the 
“dirty” contract after the bribe is discounted) is equal to C0, then k0 = 0 and for all k > 0 the 
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expectation will be less than the expectation arising from a clean tender. Therefore, in order 
to secure a higher expectation, participants will overprice their offers above the bribe.6 
This observation furnishes a method to empirically evaluate a system’s 
control/enforcement efficiency. We can tentatively use as u the perceptions of participants 
in a given market about proportions of biased tenders; say, 20%. Suppose that the overprice 
1 C  – C0, likewise assessed by surveys and cross-market price comparisons, is about 10%. 
Suppose further that the market in question defines penalties of ca. 10% of a typical 
contract’s value (such low values occur when penalties are limited e.g. to forfeiture of 
guarantees).7 Suppose tenders with five participants. Given these premises, eq. (3.2) gives 
for the “threshold” control factor the level of 8.3%. Together with the 20% informed by the 
perceptions, this gives about 1.7% over all tenders. So, in order for the control and 
enforcement mechanisms to be adequate to the system’s vulnerability and to the penalties 
available, the detected fraudulent tenders should be at least 1.7% of the total tenders. This is 
then compared with the number of actual cases of biased tenders that are detected and 
punished in that environment. If the observed level is less than 1.7% of the total tenders, it 
can be concluded that the control mechanisms are insufficient to deal with the propensity to 
bribe in that environment. 
As an assessment of the overprice in tenders might be subjected to controversy, instead 
of reasoning on the basis of eq. (3.1). a second-best alternative to determine the system’s 
parameters is to equate eq. (2.5) to the expectation arising from a clean tender in that 




(1 – u)C0. 
                                                 
6   Kim (2000) argues to the contrary, namely, that firms do not gain from bribery, all such profits going to 
agents. 
7   There are countries where bribers are not subjected to penalties (R = 0), as e.g. Ecuador and Colombia. In 
those countries, controls should be 100% effective in order to exert any influence on participants’ 
expectations. 
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This leads to a “clean” threshold of 
1





now replacing  1 C  by C0 (the average unit price in that market) and making r = 
0 C
R
, we get 
1









This can be used as a rule of thumb to assess a system’s efficiency in curbing bribery in 
tenders. 
 
4 Public  officials 
Now for the side of agents. Given a tender, the factors affecting their decisions are 
similar as for firms, and in some cases the same: 
u  The likelihood of bribing occurring in the tender; 
B   The amount received as a bribe; 
Q  The penalty paid if a bribee is caught red-handed; 
k  The probability of a bribee being caught; 
T  (At least in principle), a reward awarded to the agent if the tender is not 
corrupted. 
The agent’s decision tree is thus 
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T
1 - k B 
1 - u
u




The strategy for public officials is straightforward. If the system easily allows for 
agents exercising discretion, then the likelihood of their deciding to take bribes is high. If 
they take bribes, then they benefit from the amount B of the bribe, incurring in the 
corresponding risk. Note that, as normally T  =  0, differently from firms there are no 
material gains to be earned by public officials that do not take bribes. 
The probabilities governing the public official “game” are: 
P(PO wins a bribe) = u(1 – k)  
P(PO is punished) = uk 
P(PO does not take a bribe) = 1 – u. 
And the expectation for the random variable Y = “outcome for PO” is 
E(Y) = u[(1 – k)B – kQ] + (1 – u)T ( 4.1) 
so that, again, everything works in favour of bribery prevailing, moreover considering that 
T is usually zero.8 This is nothing more than the classical problem with the public sector: 
There are no direct material incentives for not abusing power. As a matter of fact, upon 
examining equilibrium conditions in sealed-bid auctions, Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2000) 
                                                 
8   Klitgaard (1991) introduces a moral penalty together with Q. See footnote 5, above. 
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argue that bribe-taking could be eliminated in an economically efficient manner if 
procuring agencies adopted a simple profit-sharing contract with their officials, similar to 
those used by auction firms. 
Similarly to what was done in the case of firms, we can identify empirically 
measurable parameters to ascertain a system’s efficiency in curbing corruption in tenders. 
Eq. (4.1) is positive till the control/enforcement factor k reaches a certain level, getting 
negative from that point on. The turning point k0 depends on the ratio between the penalty 
and the bribe, thus (for u 
 0): k0 = 1/(r + 1), where r = Q/B. It is obvious that defining stiff 
penalties for public officials has a strong effect on the requirements for the control 
mechanisms. Thus, for r = 100, k0 	 1%, and for r = 200, k0 	 0.5%. 
This shows that the prevalence of corruption in environments where penalties for 
corrupt public officials exist (and they always exist in some form) is a direct consequence 
of almost complete lack of control and enforcement – in these environments, perforce the 
control probability is less than the k0 threshold. 
Conversely, in a given environment, equation (4.1) might help policy-makers define 
parameters to control corruption among public officials that deal with public procurement. 
Suppose a department that purchases goods or services with an average contract value of C. 
Let B = C, where  is a percentage over C (information about which is collected in the 
market, as is commonly done in surveys), and let W be the average annual wage 
individually earned by the agents in question. Suppose that the percentage of public 
officials involved with procurement that are punished for bribery is k. Define Q = W. We 














Thus, for C = 100,  = 5%, W = 50 and k = 1%, the minimum  turns out to be about 
10. That is, given those parameters, in order for the control mechanisms to work, penalties 
should amount to at least ten times the income individually received by officials. (When 
more than one official is involved with tenders,  must be divided by this number, perhaps 
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not uniformly – usually there is a “pecking order”). Of course, from (4.2) one can express 
any other variable as a function of the others. For instance, in order to determine 
maximums for contract values that agents earning W can become involved with, or 
conversely, what minimum salary a functionary should earn in order to be authorised to 
work with procurement involving contracts of value C.9 
The advantage of targeting control mechanisms on public officials is that, differently 
from firms, they are directly subsumed to administrative regulations. Programs aimed at 
perfecting control mechanism can more easily impose new procedures on officials than on 
private firms. As the risk factor k is in principle the same for both firms and officials, 
bettering control and enforcement over the latter directly acts on firm’s expectations and, 
thus, on their behaviour. 
 
5  Factors influencing the likelihood of bribing 
In the model developed so far, we did not constrain the probability u. However, there 
are conditions operating on the environment that influence the propensity to bribe. The 
most obvious is the formal conditions governing tenders. If the institutional conditions too 
easily allow for public officials to artificially erect entry barriers – and thus to introduce 
biases in tenders –, then bribery becomes easier. Lax public procurement systems allow for 
too many opportunities for public officials to erect entry barriers in return for bribes. 
Stricter systems strive to eliminate such opportunities. 
Another factor influencing the propensity to bribe is the efficiency of the control 
mechanisms (k). If controls are effective, then it is natural to expect that they will have a 
dampening effect on the propensity to bribe. We can inject this into u as a feedback and put 
                                                 
9   See Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) for a discussion on the relationship between public official wages 
and corruption, based on data collected in 25 countries. 
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 for all k,s;   (5.1) 
with 
k  0, s  0   u  1;    
and, for now (see below), 
k  1, s  1  u  0.  
In general, functions of the type f(k,s) = a + bg(k)h(s), with g and h individually 
obeying (5.1) and suitable a and b, would do. The following examples satisfy the 
conditions: 
g(k) = (1 – k)
n for all n > 0; 





 s  for all  
 0,1. 
and a = 0, b = 1. 
However, economic actors do not statically accept whatever constraints the 
environment establishes, but rather find ways to neutralise them. This means that we could 




















That is, if the system does not evolve, then the likelihood of bribing grows. With this in 
hand, and taking into account the conditions (5.1) on f, we can derive that in order for an 
























 (controls stagnate), then s must grow over time according to 
















and likewise swapping s and k. 
For a system to remain healthy, the institutional framework and the control 
mechanisms must always evolve, and when one stagnates, the other must make up for the 
“time-drag” effect by evolving more rapidly. If both s an k stop, then u grows, tenders 
becomes more and more biased and the efficiency of the system deteriorates. The 
approximate dependency of u = f(k,s,t) on k,  s and t would be ascertainable only 
empirically. 
  
6  Prevention vs. detection 
As we have seen, at least in principle control mechanisms play a fundamental role in 
public procurement systems. If controls function very well, then other factors negatively 
influencing the likelihood of bribing need not be as strong. However, control mechanisms 
are difficult and expensive to devise, maintain and apply. Furthermore, enforcement of 
penalties applied to culprits of detected bribery requires a well-functioning Judiciary 
system, something that it is not guaranteed to exist in many countries. 
Acts of corruption in general can be divided into two categories: Those that originate  
in unlawful acts and those that come from lawful manipulation of regulations. The first are 
the easiest to detect, given that controls exist. For instance, if a public official falsely attests 
that a contract is being executed according to specifications, then in order to identify 
wrongdoing it suffices to compare the latter with the former. Fundamentally, evidence as to 
the wrongdoing exists. Once a public official and a firm break the law, the fact that money 
changed hands is only a detail, and bribery may be presumed, even if perhaps not punished. 
Directly proving that bribery occurred is always very difficult, due to the secret nature of 
the act. Corrupt people do not issue receipts and bribers avoid registering this type of 
financial dealings in their books. Tracing money across bank accounts, phantom firms, go-
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betweens and fiscal heavens is not an easy accomplishment, and the expenses involved 
preclude applying sophisticated investigation techniques in a day-to-day basis. This means 
that despite the critical role played by the efficiency of control and enforcement 
mechanisms in shaping the expectation of participants, one should not stake exaggerated 
hopes on it. 
Cases of corruption of the second, “lawful”, kind tends to be much less detected than 
cases of the first, “unlawful” kind. What is “lawful” corruption? For instance, suppose an 
environment where requirements for pre-qualification of firms to bid in tenders – such as 
thresholds for capital and/or liabilities, “technical experience” and so on –  are freely 
defined by the agent. Then it is very easy to lawfully use such requirements to erect entry 
barriers to favour one participant at the expense of the others. As the restrictive conditions 
are perfectly legal, in order to prove that a tender was deliberately biased it becomes 
necessary to prove that a kickback was paid – and this is very difficult. In contrast, in an 
environment where conditions are not subjected to public officials’ whims, directing 
tenders is more difficult. A perfect system would completely eliminate opportunities for 
public officials to erect entry barriers, and thus would restrict corruption to unlawful acts. 
Therefore, while punishments and controls are the factors exerting the strongest effect on 
the financial expectation of both firms and public officials involved in tenders, their 
continuous application is expensive and improbable. Acting on the institutional 
environment produces a more profound effect on the system’s efficiency – and far beyond 
simple corruption –, making controls less critical. Furthermore, as argued above, the 
institutional framework must evolve continuously over time in order to catch up with the 
evolving techniques the actors develop to maximise their expectations. 
In many environments, regulations are very lax and vague, mentioning only that 
tenders must be “fair”, that “equal opportunity” must be guaranteed and so forth.  For 
instance, this is how the guidelines for procurement issued by international financing 
institutions are framed. However, those terms are virtually devoid of meaning if taken in 
isolation. “Fairness” in things concerning the public interest is not something that can be 
left to the decision of one person, or of a group or persons, however well-meaning they may 
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be  – “fair” should be what the law says is fair, doubful cases being resolved by the 
Judiciary. 
As corruption stems from the the discretionary power of public agents, it follows that 
diminishing the latter favourably affects the former. This is why procurement law should be 
as much procedural as possible. Also, as public procurement regulation is nothing more 
than regulation applicable to certain markets, the matter should be primarily addressed from 
the economic perspective. This means that “fairness” and other desiderata for public 
markets should be explicitly defined in each case so as to stimulate competition, avoid 
entry-barrier-erecting prerogatives to individuals and generally strive for maximum 
efficiency. Finally, a requirement of openness for public markets requires that information 
held by the principal must be equally shared with interested parties (and the public). 
Although the aim of this paper is not to advocate this or that set of regulations, it is 
worth briefly listing some features of public procurement regulations that help stimulate 
better efficiency: 
1.  Guaranteeing that regulations are uniform across all public organisms.10 Different 
rules for different offices correspond to entry barriers and stimulate cartels. 
2.  Guaranteeing that all public purchases above a specified – and low – value are done 
by bidding, with a very limited set of exceptions (relating to catastrophes etc.). 
Provide for pre-procurement of “emergency” contracts. 
3.  Guaranteeing that all phases of a tender are separated by explicitly specified periods 
of time. 
                                                 
10  Reasoning on the basis of a model, Ganuza and Hauk (2001) argue that different propensities to corruption 
hampers economic integration (entailing the adoption of common rules) between countries and, 
conversely, that the forces acting on integration can help reduce corruption in member countries. 
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4.  Requiring that all information pertaining to a tender and the ensuing contract is 
made public. Not allowing for the terms of the contract to be altered by negotiations 
between the winner and the agent after adjudication.11 
5.  Requiring that the announcement of the tender maximally specify the object to be 
purchased, in order to avoid arbitrary decisions later, that adjudicate contracts to 
firms that offered characteristics not previously specified. As the procurement 
process must not depart from the equal information principle, such uninvited 
peculiarities should not be considered in the decision. 
6.  Requiring that formal conditions to participate (that is, requirements not involving 
the tender’s nature, but only the firm’s status) do not depart from reasonable factors 
and explicitly stated percentages; these requirements must be limited to firms’ 
capital and liabilities, their compliance to national laws concerning taxes and labour 
obligations, and their not being blacklisted by reason of previous offences. Likewise 
as to contractual guarantees. 
7. Prohibiting  “previous  experience” of firms as a criterion for pre-qualification. Firms 
cannot have experience, only persons can. 
8.  Prohibiting the requirement that firms own equipment or have certain types of 
professionals in their fixed payrolls. Equipment is rented and personnel is hired. But 
requiring from participants letters of intention from equipment suppliers to the 
effect that the latter will rent such equipment if the interested firm wins the contract. 
Likewise as to personnel. 
9. Guaranteeing that the decision process is always explicitly stated in the 
announcement and is based exclusively on objectively measurable factors. In 
particular for standard goods and services, public works and systems using 
                                                 
11  See Bös (2001) for an argument for negotiating the conditions of contracts after the tender is decided. 
However, his model does not include the possibility of corruption. 
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commodities as components (such as computer systems, telephony etc.), prohibiting 
the attribution of “grades” to items from a proposal, which is unavoidably 
subjective. While it is impossible to avoid a degree of subjectivity in certain tenders 
(as is the case of consultancy, or new technological solutions, or contests for 
projects), it is not true that subjectivity inherently intervenes in all types of tenders. 
Even in those cases, the decision should be attributed to bodies formed not only by 
public officials, but also by members of the public and/or the professions. 
10. Defining stiff penalties for winners that refuse to sign contracts. 
11.  Providing for open mechanisms allowing the public to follow all procurement 
processes. 
12. Guaranteeing that payments are made according to strict chronological order, so as 
to avoid the need for firms to “buy” from dishonest officials the right to be paid. 
13.  Guaranteeing that contract amendments are strictly limited to stated percentages 
and, when they happen, that they do not affect the structural elements of the 
contract. 
14. Stiffly penalising non-performance of contracts. 
15.  Guaranteeing o participants and the public the right to administratively and 
juridically contest agents’ decisions. 
16.  Providing for public blacklisting of corruptors. Firms that fail to observe the 
country’s laws on fraud and corruption must be declared ineligible to participate in 
tenders during defined periods of time. 
17. Explicitly criminalising corrupt behaviour both from public administrators and from 
corruptor firms’ representatives. 
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If requirements as these are accepted as desirable, then it follows that their absence in a 
given environment is evidence of vulnerability. This observation points to a method to 
estimate the institutional health of countries in what regards public procurement. A first 
approximation to this was coordinated in early 2002 by the author,12 within a project 
sponsored by Transparency International aimed at evaluating the vulnerabilities affecting 
public procurement in a number of Latin American countries. The methodology was based 
on the definition of 22 possible entry barrier-erecting opportunities and the identification of 
their presence in each environment.13 
Developing numerical indicators able to at least partially capture an environment’s 
institutional soundness and comparing them to other indicators (such as governance, rule of 
law, perceptions of corruption, as well as concentration and other econometric data) would 
help to better understand the factors affecting efficiency in public markets. 
                                                 
12  CWA et. al. (2002). 
13   The procedure was affected by lack of methodological uniformity and by the fact that in-country 
assessments were not subjected to independent counter-check. 
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